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Extended Abstract
Consider a situation in which a set of agents has the option of sharing the cost
of their joint actions. For example, a group of retailers, instead of individually
managing each of their own storage facilities, may decide to jointly participate
in a centralized inventory management scheme with a common storage facility,
and share the cost of optimally running this facility. In these situations, the
agents may or may not be motivated to cooperate, depending on the structure
of their costs. Cooperative game theory offers a mathematical framework to
study the cooperative behavior between multiple agents. A (transferable utility)
cooperative game is a pair (N, v) where N = {1, . . . , n} represents a set of agents,
and v : 2N → IR is a set function where for each S ⊆ N , v(S) represents the
cost to agents in S if they cooperate. By convention, v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N
of agents is referred to as a coalition.
Cooperative games whose costs are determined by various problems in op-
erations research and computer science have been studied before. A short and
necessarily incomplete list of examples includes assignment games [1], linear pro-
duction games [2], minimum-cost spanning tree games [3], traveling salesman
games [4], scheduling-related games [5,6,7], facility location games [8], newsven-
dor games and inventory centralization games [9,10], and economic lot-sizing
games [11,12].
In this work, we are concerned with situations in which agents face super-
modular costs. A set function v : 2N 7→ IR is supermodular if
v(S ∪ {j})− v(S) ≤ v(S ∪ {j, k})− v(S ∪ {k}) for all S ⊆ N \ {j, k}. (1)
In words, supermodularity captures the notion of increasing marginal costs. We
study cooperative games (N, v) where v is nonnegative, and supermodular. We
call such games supermodular cost cooperative games. Supermodularity often nat-
urally arises in situations in which the costs are intimately tied with congestion
effects. It has been shown that several variants of the facility location problem
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have supermodular costs [13], and as we show in this work, various problems
from scheduling and network design also exhibit supermodular costs.
Intuitively, cooperation amongst rational agents who face supermodular costs
is unlikely: as the size of a coalition grows, the marginal cost associated with
adding a particular agent increases, diminishing the appeal of cooperation. Var-
ious solution concepts from cooperative game theory help us formalize this in-
tuition. Suppose x ∈ IRN is a cost allocation vector: for all i ∈ N , xi represents
the cost allocated to agent i. (For notational convenience, for any vector x we
define x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi for any S ⊆ N .) The prominent solution concept for
cooperative games is the core [14]. The core of a cooperative game (N, v) is the
set of all cost allocations x such that
x(N) = v(N), (2)
x(S) ≤ v(S) for all S ⊆ N. (3)
The condition (2) requires that a cost allocation in the core is efficient : the total
cost allocated to all agents, x(N), is equal to the cost of all agents cooperating,
v(N). The conditions (3) guarantee that a cost allocation in the core is stable:
no subset of agents, or coalition, would be better off by abandoning the rest of
the agents and acting on its own. The existence of an efficient and stable cost
allocation—in other words, a non-empty core—can be seen as a rudimentary
indication that cooperation is attainable. It is well-known that when costs are
submodular1, the core is non-empty [15]. On the other hand, it is straightforward
to see that for supermodular cost cooperative games, the core is in fact empty
(as long as costs are not modular2).
In certain situations, the failure to cooperate may give rise to negative ex-
ternalities. Consider the following example. A set of agents needs to process its
jobs on a machine that generates an excessive amount of pollution. The agents
have the opportunity to share the cost of processing their jobs on an existing
single machine, but the cost of processing their jobs is such that it is cheaper
for each agent to open their own machine, and as a result, generate more pol-
lution. An authority may be interested in reducing such negative externalities.
One approach would be to incorporate the cost of the pollution externalities
directly into the processing costs; however, these externality costs may be hard
to precisely define. Instead, one might ask, “How much do we need to charge for
opening an additional machine in order to encourage all agents to share a single
machine?” For an arbitrary cooperative game, the analogous question is, “How
much do we need to penalize a coalition for acting independently in order to
encourage all the agents to cooperate?” This notion is captured in the least core
value of a cooperative game. The least core [16,17] of a cooperative game (N, v)
1 A function v is submodular if −v is supermodular.
2 A set function is modular if it is both submodular and supermodular.
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is the set of cost allocations x that are optimal solutions to the linear program
z∗ = minimize z
subject to x(N) = v(N),
x(S) ≤ v(S) + z for all S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, N.
(LC)
The optimal value z∗ of (LC) is the least core value of the game (N, v). In words,
the least core value z∗ is the minimum penalty we need to charge a coalition
for acting independently that ensures a basic prerequisite for cooperation is
satisfied: the existence of an efficient and stable cost allocation. Note that the
linear program (LC) is in fact equivalent to the optimization problem
z∗ = min
x:x(N)=v(N)
max
S⊆N
S 6=∅,N
e(x, S),
where e(x, S) = x(S) − v(S) for all S ⊆ N . The quantity e(x, S) is the dissat-
isfaction of a coalition S under a cost allocation x: it is the extra cost that S
pays when costs are allocated according to x.3 A cost allocation in the least core
therefore minimizes the maximum dissatisfaction of any coalition. Note that the
least core is always well-defined and non-empty, regardless of whether the core
is empty or non-empty4.
A fair amount of attention has been devoted to the least core of various
cooperative games in the economics and game theory literature [18,19,20,21,22,
for example]. In addition, the computational complexity of computing a cost
allocation in the least core has been studied previously in several contexts. Faigle,
Kern and Paulusma [23] showed that computing a cost allocation in the least
core of minimum-cost spanning tree games is NP-hard. Kern and Paulusma [24]
presented a polynomial description of the linear program (LC) for cardinality
matching games. Faigle, Kern and Kuipers [25] showed that by using the ellipsoid
method, a so-called pre-kernel element in the least core of a cooperative game
can be efficiently computed if the maximum dissatisfaction can be efficiently
computed for any given efficient cost allocation. Properties of the least core value,
on the other hand, seem to have been largely ignored. Deng [26] observed that
polynomial-time algorithms for submodular function minimization can be used
to compute the least core and least core value of submodular cost cooperative
games in polynomial time.
Contributions of this work
In this work, we study the computational complexity and approximability of the
least core value of supermodular cost cooperative games. We motivate the inter-
est in supermodular cost cooperative games by providing a class of optimization
3 This quantity is sometimes referred to as the excess of a coalition in the cooperative
game theory literature.
4 The linear program (LC) is clearly feasible. Adding the inequalities xi ≤ v({i}) + z
for all i ∈ N and using the equality x(N) = v(N), we have that z∗ ≥ 1|N| (v(N) −P
i∈N v({i})). So as long as costs are finite, the optimal value of (LC) is finite and
the least core value is well defined.
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problems whose optimal costs are supermodular. This class of optimization prob-
lems includes a variety of classical scheduling and network design problems. We
show that finding the least core value of supermodular cost cooperative games is
strongly NP-hard, and design a (3 + )-approximation algorithm for computing
the least core value of these games, using oracles that determine coalitions whose
dissatisfaction is approximately maximum. As a by-product, we also show how
to compute accompanying approximate least core cost allocations.
We apply our results to two subclasses of supermodular cost cooperative
games: scheduling games and matroid profit games. Scheduling games are coop-
erative games in which the costs are derived from the minimum sum of weighted
completion times on a single machine. We show that for these games, the Shap-
ley value5—which is computable in polynomial time—is in the least core, while
computing the least core value is NP-hard. We also give a fully polynomial time
approximation scheme for computing the least core value of scheduling games.
Matroid profit games are cooperative games in which the profit to a coalition
arises from the maximum weight of an independent set of a matroid. Some
scheduling and network design problems have been shown to be special cases of
finding a maximum weight independent set of a matroid. Using our approxima-
tion framework with the appropriate natural modifications, we show that the
least core value and a least core cost allocation of matroid profit games can be
computed in polynomial time.
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